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Main findings 
The COVID-19 crisis is exacerbating inequalities between 
countries, regions and social groups.
The twin sustainable and digital transitions are necessary 
to avoid the drastic effects of climate change, transform the 
economy towards a more prosperous and sustainable mod-
el, and simultaneously ensure economic growth. However, 
these structural transformations can have uneven effects 
and impact the most vulnerable actors disproportionally.
If designed well, Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) 
could provide a comprehensive, long-term investment and 
reform strategy for successful twin transitions while ensur-
ing social and territorial cohesion. They are highly salient 
in national political debates, indicating strong national 
political ownership of the content. However, the process 
appears often untransparent, managed by the government 
behind rather closed doors and with limited stakeholders’ 
consultations.
The tight common framework imposed by the European 
Commission has helped create coherence between the na-
tional RRPs. However, this is only the case in broad terms, 
as the details are often lacking or fragmented. 
The RRPs’ links to other EU programmes and the presence 
of cross-border projects are limited. There are some excep-
tions, but these are generally poorly described. 
National governments’ willingness to take up the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility loans seems highly differentiated 
and likely dependent on their economic convenience. Of the 
countries which are included in this paper’s case studies, 
only Italy and Greece intend to make full use of their share 
of loans.
RRPs generally represent a good basis for medium- and 
long-term strategies, with good foresight and structural 
objectives. The RRPs’ expected impact on social, economic 
and territorial cohesion is well recognised in most of the 
objectives of the sample countries’ drafts. Nevertheless, 
the drafts must be improved by being more detailed. The 
lack of detail and thorough impact assessments imply that 
the countries are not necessarily addressing the impact on 
cohesion comprehensively.
Recommendations
Member states and the European Commission should 
improve the content of RRPs by enhancing cross-references 
and links between measures, exploiting complementari-
ties with other EU funding sources, and strengthening the 
reforms’ components.
The Commission should strengthen the EU dimension by 
highlighting potential cross-country synergies between 
RRPs. It should put in place a flexible framework for coop-
eration between governments, brokering the first steps to 
reduce complexity and risks linked to cross-border projects.
To mainstream support for socio-economic and territorial 
cohesion, the Commission should impose ex ante territorial 
and social impact assessments. These assessments should 
analyse the RRPs’ effects on not only economic growth but 
also the well-being of citizens.
To implement the RRPs correctly, the Commission should 
request as many details on the measures as possible, and 
intermediate and ex post assessments from the member 
states. In turn, national governments should improve the 




The core research question of the “National Recovery and 
Resilience Plans: enablers of the twin transformations?” 
project is the following:
Will the national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) 
lead to successful and coherent green and digital transi-
tions while also ensuring social and territorial cohesion?
Five project partners conducted an in-depth analysis of 
their respective member states’ draft RRPs. The sam-
ple countries were selected on the basis of several key 
factors: 
•  the early availability of a detailed draft RRP that pro-
vides sufficient information to be subject to the analy-
sis (i.e. February to March 2021); 
•  the relative significance of the amount of funding re-
ceived by the country; and
•  the most expansive geographical representation possi-
ble, conditional on the availability of information. 
Consequently, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Poland 
were selected as the five case studies. 
The project is dependent on the advancement of the five 
countries’ political debate regarding their respective RRP 
and, more importantly, the availability of information. 
The publication of draft national RRPs, publicising of 
negotiations, and communication with the press and/or 
stakeholders differ greatly between countries. Although 
the utmost attention is paid to investigate and report as 
accurately as possible, the final RRPs submitted to the 
European Commission could differ from the drafts ana-
lysed in this paper. 
The information contained in this paper is up to date as of 
9 April 2021.
The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the EU hard. Its dispropor-
tionate effects on some member states have resulted in EU 
leaders and the European Commission putting in place an 
unprecedented crisis response package, Next Generation 
EU (NGEU). For the first time ever, the EU will borrow large 
amounts of funding from the financial markets, which is 
then allocated to member states as grants and loans. This 
represents a paradigm shift in the Union as many countries 
had, until now, always opposed joint borrowing and  
EU-financed grants. 
The NGEU’s main instrument, the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF), will provide funding to member states over 
the next five years, especially to the more vulnerable ones. 
Such important expenditure support is not only a mecha-
nism that addresses the economic impact of the pandemic 
but also a much-needed opportunity to finance the twin 
transitions towards a more sustainable and digitalised 
economy. Member states are thus required to submit na-
tional Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) which outline 
their respective investment and reform strategies on using 
the RRF financing.
The RRPs should outline a five-year reform and investment 
strategy that will allow the member states to rebound from 
the COVID-19 crisis and set the right pace of transformation 
needed for successful and fair digital and sustainable tran-
sitions (i.e. the twin transitions). By following the priorities 
and targets set at the EU level, the 27 RRPs should bring 
the Union towards this common objective coherently and 
cohesively.
This paper gathers the research results of “National Recov-
ery and Resilience Plans: enablers of the twin transforma-
tions?”, a joint EPC–KAS project. It analyses draft national 
RRPs’ contents, structures and coherence. It explores their 
level of internal and external coherence between different 
projects, investments and reforms, as well as to the other 
plans.
The RRPs include various policy measures, from struc-
tural reforms of the public administration to investment 
in digital infrastructure; from reforms of pension and tax 
systems to incentivising building renovation and renewable 
energy sources (RES). Acknowledging this variety, the joint 
EPC–KAS project focuses on the investments and reforms 
proposed for the twin transitions. The intention is to provide 
a (preliminary) assessment of whether the draft RRPs are 
on the right track in promoting the transitions successfully. 
The twin transitions must not come at any cost. Analysing 
and addressing the RRPs’ potential secondary or indirect 
effects – positive or negative – on social, economic and 
territorial cohesion remains of utmost importance. This will 
ensure not only that all stakeholders accept the twin tran-
sitions but also a positive long-term impact on all economic 
and social actors and regions/areas. 
Like any structural change, the twin transitions will create 
winners and losers. A well-thought investment and reform 
strategy is one that ensures that the losers are accounted 
for and supported through the change.
 Introduction1.
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2.1. COVID-19 EXACERBATING INEQUALITIES
One year into the COVID-19 crisis, its long-term effects are 
still uncertain. Nonetheless, some considerations regarding 
its potential effects can already be made. While the crisis 
has hit all countries, economic sectors and citizens, its 
consequences are asymmetric as some are more vulnerable 
to the shock than others. Additionally, they will likely face 
more difficulties in recovering from the crisis.1
First and foremost, the crisis has exposed pre-existing 
weaknesses in EU health systems and their need for struc-
tural reforms. Aspects to consider include structural weak-
nesses in the organisation and delivery of health services, 
the promotion of the sector’s digital transition, and severe 
staff shortages.2
Second, the service sector is impacted more strongly than 
manufacturing and is expected to take longer to bounce 
back. Within the sector, some industries – hospitality, 
events, transportation, retail commerce, leisure – are im-
pacted disproportionately. This uneven impact is not only 
economic but also societal, with the potential of increasing 
disparities. Women, youth and low-skilled workers have 
been more heavily affected than others as they are em-
ployed in these sectors disproportionately.3 
Third, as national governments deployed and the EU sup-
ported broad employment support measures (i.e. SURE, or 
Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency), 
a large spike in unemployment was prevented until today. 
Nevertheless, the most vulnerable employment categories 
(e.g. self-employed, temporary and seasonal workers, those 
in other non-standard employment), which are only partially 
covered by public protection schemes (if at all), have been 
affected heavily.4 The COVID-19 crisis has exposed the gaps 
in social protection and welfare systems, created in pre-
vious years by deliberate policy choices and the changing 
world of work.5
Fourth, there is a geographical dimension to the crisis: 
some areas are affected more than others. From a health 
perspective, this is due to the formation of COVID-19 
outbreaks. However, other factors are also at play. More 
socio-economically deprived areas tend to suffer from 
higher COVID-19 death numbers. Causes include higher 
population density, overexposure to at-risk occupations 
(see previous point), poverty, poor housing conditions, and 
the weak capacity of health systems.6 Certain economic 
factors also determine the regions which are being hit the 
hardest. These include the economic structure (e.g. heavy 
reliance on tourism and personal services), dependence 
on exports and/or international supply chains, the (over-)
representation of vulnerable types of employment and/
or of occupations not amenable to remote working (often 
low-skilled work), and scarce connectivity which impedes 
remote working.7
In addition to the nature of the pandemic, the length and 
depth of its economic effect depend on the resilience of 
regions, socio-economic actors and economic sectors. 
Those that are more rigid and have less political, adminis-
trative, economic and social capacity to adapt to the new, 
post-pandemic normal will take longer to recover from the 
crisis. Those who are less resilient now are usually those 
who were already vulnerable before the pandemic hit (e.g. 
regions with limited growth performance, low-skilled work-
ers). This dynamic places pressure on the upward conver-
gence process, likely resulting in further polarisation and 
fragmentation between and within countries.
 
 
2.2. THE GREEN AND DIGITAL TRANSITIONS 
 NEED TO LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND
Climate change, technological change and digitalisation 
are global trends that were already well underway before 
the pandemic. The transition towards a more high-value, 
knowledge-intensive industrial model is also imperative to 
supporting the health and success of the EU’s productive 
sectors. In addition to preventing the far-reaching effects 
of climate change, which is potentially existential for any 
society, these transitions can create economic prosperity 
and stability in the long term. 
These trends and transitions imply structural transforma-
tions across all economic actors (i.e. public and private), 
industrial sectors and societal groups. The scale of change 
is enormous and pervasive, going deep into the socio- 
economic fabric of all EU member states. The amount of 
public and private investment needed to accomplish the 
green and digital transitions, as well as the scale of the 
needed structural reforms, are daunting.
 A decade of structural transformations: 
 The twin transitions and COVID-192.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1  Pilati, Marta and Alison Hunter (2020), „EU lagging regions: state of play and future challenges“, Brussels: European Parliament and OECD (2020), “The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government”, Paris: OECD Publishing. 
2   Extensive EPC work has been carried out on these topics. Please refer to Well-performing public services for a fair and resilient European society and  Turning a new vision into reality: What next for the EU’s role in health?
3   OECD (2021), “OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2021”, Paris: OECD Publishing.
4   Weber, Tina, John Hurley and Dragoș  Adăscăliței (2021), “COVID-19: Implications for employment and working life”, Luxembourg: Eurofound and Guagliardo, Simona and Mihai Palimariciuc (2021), “ Well-performing public services for a fair and resilient European society”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
5   Dhéret, Claire, Simona Guagliardo and Mihai Palimariciuc (2019), “The future of work: Towards a progressive agenda for all”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
6   OECD (2020), “The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government”, Paris: OECD Publishing.
7   Ibid. OECD (2020), “The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government”, Paris: OECD Publishing
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The need to stimulate post-pandemic economic recovery is 
a valuable occasion to push these transitions forward. The 
recovery funding, especially the RRF, should align the wider 
objectives of achieving a sustainable and digital economy 
and set the basis for a successful transformation. Addition-
ally, from a political perspective, the RRF’s contribution to 
structural change was necessary to gain all the member 
states’ support (see section 2.3.). 
However, while there is a common goal for these trans-
formations – reaching a sustainable and inclusive society, 
economy and model of growth –, the scale of the required 
change is not the same for everyone involved. To be suc-
cessful, the sustainable and digital transitions will require 
adaptations in production processes, public administration 
and services, education, the labour market, skill base, ener-
gy mix and infrastructure, and more. There is large hetero-
geneity across the EU regarding these policy fields, implying 
that the transformation towards the common objectives will 
require different, tailored efforts.
From a geographical perspective, EU regions that are less 
developed and/or underperform economically are also less 
equipped to successfully engage in the twin transitions. A 
recent EPC study puts forward the following conclusions:8
• The twin transitions may force some occupations to 
transform significantly or disappear completely. While 
they are expected to create new jobs, an issue arises 
if the jobs created and lost are not located in the same 
area and to the same workers. This is notably the case 
for regions whose labour market is heavily reliant on 
energy-intensive industries (e.g. extraction and process-
ing of fossil fuels). As large workforce mobility cannot 
be assumed, labour repurposing and retraining will be 
necessary to avoid higher localised unemployment.
• All economic sectors will demand more (and new) 
skilled job profiles with more knowledge and technolo-
gy intensity. Areas where the skill base is less advanced 
and/or there is less capacity to support in-work training 
will be less successful in engaging with the transitions 
quickly. This could result in negative effects on prosperity 
in the long term.
• In order to reap the benefits of the digital transition 
and improved connectivity, digital infrastructure 
remains crucial. The ‘digital divide’ across EU regions is 
a cause for concern, as the lack of appropriate (digital) 
infrastructure can exclude entire areas from high-value 
activities. It can also challenge existing activities, which 
might move elsewhere and therefore lead to economic 
decline. Similarly, it can prevent some areas from bene-
fitting from digital public services.
Social aspects must be a central focus when planning struc-
tural changes. Social cohesion will be the key determinant 
of the success or failure of the twin transitions. If these 
major transformations are perceived as leaving individuals, 
vulnerable groups or regions behind and/or forcing them 
to shoulder most of the burden, public support for these 
structural transitions will diminish. This would risk their 
overall success and thereby reduce the resilience of the EU 
economy. 
Some potential social effects of the twin transitions that are 
worth mentioning are listed below.
• The impact of technological change on the labour 
market. For example, new forms of work linked directly 
to digitalisation, notably platform work, have recently 
emerged. Social protection systems have not always 
been able to adapt to these labour developments, result-
ing in protection gaps.9
• The employment risk of automation. One in five low-in-
come jobs is at risk of automation. This is one in six for 
middle-income jobs and only one in ten for high-income 
work.10 Job disruption caused by automation represents 
a real concern of increased inequality and new instability.
• The symbiotic relationship between social exclusion 
and digital exclusion. Vulnerable and socially excluded 
groups use the internet and technological tools less than 
the rest of the population, as they tend to have fewer dig-
ital skills and access. This digital exclusion also prevents 
them from reaping the benefits of new technologies, 
leading to poor educational attainment, for example. This 
exacerbates their social exclusion further.11
• Low-income groups’ vulnerability to price increases. If 
the ecological transition leads to higher energy or mobil-
ity prices, this will be problematic for low-income groups 
(at least in the short term) and affect the poor dispropor-
tionately.12 
• The digital transition’s gender dimension. As STEM (i.e. 
science, technology, engineering, mathematics) skills 
and occupations become more important and requested 
in the labour market, there is a risk of women being left 
out of the gains and the gender gap increasing, as they 
tend to be less present in these areas.
Outlining these risks of inequality is by no means to 
undermine the need for the twin transitions. Rather, it is 
to ensure that the transitions are successful and just. 
The transitions can lead to a digital and sustainable econ-
omy and more cohesive society, as long as their benefits 
reach the more vulnerable. For example, digitalisation and 
teleworking can bring jobs and economic activities to areas 
where it is not physically feasible. Speeding through struc-
tural transformations without a strategy to prevent distor-
tive effects and counterbalance costs dooms the effort to 
failure. There is increasing recognition that Europe’s social 
and territorial cohesion must be protected.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
8  Pilati, Marta and Alison Hunter (2020), „EU lagging regions: state of play and future challenges“, Brussels: European Parliament.
9  Dhéret, Claire, Simona Guagliardo and Mihai Palimariciuc (2019), “The future of work: Towards a progressive agenda for all”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
10  OECD (2019), “Under Pressure: The Squeezed Middle Class”, Paris: OECD Publishing.
11  Martin, Chris et al. (2016), “The role of digital exclusion in social exclusion”, CarnegieUK Trust.
12  López Piqueres, Sofia and Sara Viitanen (2020), “On the road to sustainable mobility: How to ensure a just transition?”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
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The 2021 Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy acknowl-
edges these potential issues: 
“Every effort should be made to prevent unemployment 
and social exclusion from becoming entrenched and 
facilitate the adaptation of the labour market, called 
for by the green and digital transitions. It will also be 
important to foster convergence and improve the resil-
ience of the regions, in particular to reduce territorial 
disparities.” 13 
Similarly, the RRF includes ‘social and territorial cohesion’ 
among its objectives. Thus, the potential and significant 
funding to reduce uneven social effects and support vul-
nerable actors throughout the twin transitions exists.
Nevertheless, these reforms and investments must be 
well-thought and envisage a comprehensive framework 
that accounts for unintended secondary and/or indirect 
effects. 
The following areas may prove to be problematic: 
• The digitalisation of public services might reduce the 
access of those with limited digital skills and digital 
infrastructure and/or tools (e.g. internet connection, 
smartphones). It should be gradual and coupled with 
education, awareness campaigns and infrastructure 
development.
• The incentives to implement innovative (and clean) 
processes and technologies might only be enjoyed by 
already advanced (i.e. large-scale) firms with the capacity 
and skilled workforce to do so. Meanwhile, smaller, more 
traditional companies may fall further behind.
• Reforms and investments in education and the labour 
market must be carefully aligned. The incentives to dig-
italise companies’ productive processes might be void 
if the available workforce does not have the necessary 
skills to work with those innovations. The education 
of youth and retraining of the existing workforce must 
accompany these incentives. Similarly, the reverse is 
true. Investing in education without also ensuring that 
the labour market provides an adequate offer of high-
skill occupations will inevitably lead to the loss of that 
investment because of either brain drains or overqualifi-
cation.
• Deep transformations in production processes must be 
matched by workforce training and repurposing to avoid 
the risk of increased unemployment.
These are examples of issues that may arise while the RRPs 
are designed and, later, implemented. An accurate analysis 
of the measures included in the RRPs – how they interact 
with each other and other countries’ measures; their direct 
and indirect effects in the longer term – is a must.
 
2.3. THE RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE FACILITY 
 IS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY
NGEU, the Union’s recovery instrument to respond to the  
COVID-19 crisis, was approved by the European Council in July 
2020. Pending the ratification of the Own Resources Decision by 
all national parliaments, NGEU is expected to become opera-
tional in the summer of 2021. The EU will be able to borrow up 
to €750 billion from the financial markets and provide funding 
to the member states in the form of grants and loans, as well as 
increase the financing of some EU budget programmes.
 
The NGEU aims to spur the EU’s COVID-19 economic 
recovery by funding national investment and reforms that 
contribute to four general objectives: (i) promoting social, 
economic and territorial cohesion in the EU; (ii) strengthen-
ing economic and social resilience; (iii) mitigating the social 
and economic impact of the crisis; and (iv) supporting the 
green and digital transitions. 
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
The RRF accounts for the bulk of NGEU funding and can dis-
burse up to €312.5 billion worth of grants and loans total-
ling €360 billion to member states. The EU27 can request 
loans of up to 6.8% of the country’s gross national income. 
The RRF allocates grant funding to countries according to 
a criteria, to prioritise the more vulnerable member states. 
For 70% of the total grant funding, the criteria are reverse 
GDP per capita, population size and the average unemploy-
ment rate between 2015 and 2019, all relative to the EU av-
erage. For the remaining 30%, the unemployment indicator 
is replaced by the real GDP loss in 2020 and the cumulative 
real GDP loss of 2020 and 2021.
The RRF’s general objective is to promote the EU’s economic, 
social and territorial cohesion by improving resilience and 
(sustainable) growth potential, contributing to the implemen-
tation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, encouraging the 
green and digital transition, fostering employment creation, 
and so on. RRF funding must apply to the following six pil-
lars, which represent policy areas of European relevance: 14 
1. green transition;
2. digital transformation;
3. smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, including 
economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, 
research, development and innovation, and a well-func-
tioning internal market with strong SMEs;
4. social and territorial cohesion;
5. health, and economic, social and institutional resilience, 
with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness 
and crisis response capacity; and
6. policies for the next generation, children and the youth, 
such as education and skills.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
13  European Commission (2020), “Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021”, COM (2020)575 final, Brussels; p. 8.
14  Article 3 of the Regulation (EU) 2021/241 Establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility
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The Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs)
To access RRF funding, member states must present a na-
tional RRP which outlines the investment and reforms they 
plan to finance with it. The RRPs must be submitted to the 
European Commission before 30 April 2021. The Commis-
sion will then have two months to assess and eventually 
endorse or reject them before the Council can provide the 
final approval.
The Commission’s assessment will be based on criteria 
which will be graded A, B or C. To be endorsed by the Com-
mission, RRPs must score A in the first two criteria and A or 
B for the rest. A majority of As is necessary, and no criterion 
should be graded C.15 The criteria are as follows:
1. alignment with Country-Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs).
2. contribution to the green and digital transitions (at least 
37% of the funding should be allocated to green transi-
tion, and at least 20% to fostering the digital transition);
3. production of a long-lasting impact;
4. contribution to growth potential, job creation, resilience, 
and economic, social and territorial cohesion;
5. justification of costs in a reasonable, plausible and com-
mensurate way to the measures’ expected impact;
6. inclusion of reforms and investment projects that 
represent coherent actions (i.e. how they reinforce and 
complement one another); and
7. expected implementation of planning, milestones and 
targets.
Investment is defined as “capital formation in areas such as 
fixed capital, human capital, and natural capital. This would 
also cover, for instance, intangible assets such as R&D, data, 
intellectual property and skills.”16 Importantly, only non- 
recurrent costs would be considered as investments. There-
fore, operating expenditures do not quality for RRF funding. 
Also, all RRF investment must respect the ‘do no significant 
harm’ principle and exclude all activities that harm climate 
and environmental objectives, per Article 17 of Regulation 
2020/852. This principle should, by design, block all meas-
ures that may have negative climate effects.
A reform is “an action or process of making changes and 
improvements with significant impact and long-lasting 
effects”.17 It should improve framework conditions, struc-
turally change parameters and remove obstacles.
The commitment of RRF funding must occur before the 
end of 2023, with disbursement taking place in 2026 at 
the latest. This relative short timing is intended to spur the 
COVID-19 economic recovery with measures that will have 
a long-term impact. Member states can receive an advance 
RRF payment of up to 13% of their allocated total. The 
remainder is disbursed periodically if the implementation 
of the measures has been assessed as meeting the pre-set 
milestones and targets.
Lastly, the measures in the RRPs would ideally contribute 
to the common challenges identified in the 2021 Annual 
Sustainable Growth Strategy, which sets out EU-wide ambi-
tions for each of them. The ambitions are called European 
Flagships and consist of the following:
• Power up: Frontload future-proof, clean technologies 
and accelerate the development and use of renewables. 
Also, building the basis for a hydrogen market and infra-
structure.
• Renovate: Improve the energy and resource efficiency of 
buildings and foster deep renovation.
• Recharge and refuel: Support future-proof, clean tech-
nologies for sustainable transport, including charging 
stations and the extension of public transport networks.
• Connect: Improve citizens’ and businesses’ access to 
rapid broadband services, particularly by expanding the 
coverage of 5G to less connected, rural areas.
• Modernise: Update and improve access to digital public 
services and administration, including the judicial system 
and healthcare.
• Scale up: Enhance the EU industrial data cloud’s ca-
pacity and production of energy-efficient, cutting-edge 
processors.
• Reskill and upskill: Invest in digital skills and training for 
all ages to support the twin transitions, paying particular 
attention to disadvantaged groups, women and youth.
It is worth noting that only the last of the Flagships is social, 
as it focuses on the labour dimension.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
15  See Annex 5 of the Regulation (EU) 2021/241 Establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility
16  European Commission (2021), “Guidance to Member States Recovery and Resilience Plans - Part 1”, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels; p. 16
17  European Commission (2021), “Guidance to Member States Recovery and Resilience Plans - Part 1”, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels; Ibid., p.14
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Since the political agreement at the EU level in the ear-
ly summer of 2020, member states are discussing their 
strategies for designing and drafting their national RRPs. To 
effectively implement the measures to be financed by the 
RRF, especially those that require a structurally reformed 
national socio-economic system, national governments 
and their constituents must show ownership over the 
process. Past efforts of the European Semester have 
shown that many recommendations are left unrealised in 
the absence of national buy-in. With the RRF, there is a real 
chance that some of the issues mentioned (repeatedly) in 
CSRs will be picked up. Certainly, the presence of signif-
icant amounts of funding helps the cause. Nevertheless, 
the effect that national ownership can have should not be 
underestimated.
To understand whether the RRPs will be effective ena-
blers of the twin transitions, the national political context 
in which the plans are discussed and drafted should be 
explored. This is crucial to understand whether the plans 
have a real salience in the political realm or whether they 
are considered a bureaucratic and/or technical exercise of 
fulfilling the European Commission’s requirements.
Our national experts have monitored their respective coun-
try’s national debates to understand points of salience and 
contention, the opinions of the main actors in the debates, 
and public reactions. Additionally, the project explores 
issues related to the transparency of the process and the 
negotiations, and the availability of information, which in 
some cases are rather scarce.
3.1.  THE PROCESS, DEBATE AND TRANSPARENCY 
The process and debate around RRPs in this project’s five 
sample countries differ with respect to timing, their position 
on the political agenda and the amount of information made 
public.
France: 
A frontrunner with some unclarity
France was a frontrunner in the RRP process. On 14 July 
2020, before the European Council even reached the final 
agreement on NGEU, President Emmanuel Macron an-
nounced a recovery plan of €100 billion to be financed 
by both EU and national funding. The details were ironed 
out over the summer, and in early September, the final-
ised “France Relance” plan was made public. It contains 
detailed and comprehensive information on objectives, 
timelines and costs. 
France Relance is France’s exhaustive recovery strategy that 
covers the RRP. In other words, it includes both measures 
financed by the national budget and those that will make up 
the French RRP. The RRP measures will represent approxi-
mately 40% of France Relance’s budget. 
To the day of writing, the distinction between the measures 
to be included in the RRP and the rest has not been made 
available to the public. Thus, while a significant amount of 
information is available, the French RRP’s exact content 
remains unknown. Additionally, the details of the govern-
ment’s negotiations with the European Commission are 
not made public, nor are the RRP drafts. Lastly, the public 
debate on France Relance was most salient in the sum-
mer and early autumn of 2020. Since then, there has been 
little discussion on its measures and/or the RRP. Both the 
government and the public perceive the RRP drafting and 




Similarly to France, the RRP process started relatively early 
in Italy and has dominated the public debate since, driven 
by the acknowledgement of the scale of the opportunity. 
The Conte government set up a task force of experts in 
the late spring of 2020, which produced a plan containing 
investment and reform proposals. However, the Conte gov-
ernment ignored this plan for the most part when drafting 
its RRP. The initial drafting was rather untransparent, with 
the government entirely in charge of the process through a 
rather obscure inter-ministerial committee. Nevertheless, 
relatively complete drafts of the RRP were already circulat-
ed and publicised during the last months of 2020, the latest 
version being in January 2021. 
Political debate was extremely heated and led to the Conte 
government’s collapse: junior coalition party Italia Viva 
pulled out of the government in opposition to the proposed 
RRP process, content and governance structure. Mario 
Draghi was sworn in as prime minister in February 2021 and 
is reworking the RRP content, also based on the Commis-
sion’s feedback on the January draft – but, again, behind 
closed doors. The government is withholding information on 
this redrafting, and public debate has quietened since. In 
March, details on the new draft were shared with the Italian 
Parliament and public: the RRP’s main structure and meas-
ures remained largely unchanged, but details on the meas-
ures were added. The final RRP draft is due to be presented 
publicly just a few days before the 30 April deadline. 
Greece: 
Nearing the finish line
Greece started preparing its RRP in the autumn of 2020, 
and the government and political parties have been dom-
 National political debates indicate ownership 
 of the drafting process and the content3.
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inating the public debate. Overall, the RRP has attracted 
some attention but has never dominated the public sphere, 
with public debate remaining relatively limited. The govern-
ment already published the first full RRP draft on its website 
in late 2020. The complete and final version, which includes 
all details, was publicised and sent to the Hellenic Parlia-
ment on 2 April 2021. The drafting process was kept behind 
rather closed doors: the government’s discussions (i.e. with 
its private advisors and the European Commission) are not 
public.
Belgium: 
Delayed but catching up
Belgium took longer than the other countries to draft its 
RRP. The two main reasons explaining this delay are that 
Belgium had to first form a new federal government before 
progressing on this issue, which was accomplished at the 
beginning of October 2020. Secondly, RRP negotiations 
regarding the funding allocations between the federated en-
tities reached a deadlock. An agreement was only reached 
in mid-January 2021. Since then, the RRP has been high on 
the political agenda, although the draft is not yet public. The 
latest draft was sent to the European Commission on 19 
March 2021. Several national stakeholders lament the lack 
of transparency in the process.18  This high degree of opacity 
translates into Belgian civil society’s lack of ownership.
Poland: 
Gaining momentum slowly
The Polish government has taken charge of drafting its RRP 
and did not provide any information until February 2021. 
While some stakeholders were invited already to provide 
project suggestions in the summer of 2020, there has been 
little to no public debate on the RRP until the February 
draft. Since then, the RRP is gaining salience in Polish media 
and generating debate among the government coalition 
partners. The government has been criticised by many 
stakeholders who find that the process was not transparent 
enough and that there was no opportunity to discuss or 
influence the drafting.
3.2.  STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS
In all five countries of this research paper’s sample, some 
degree of public stakeholder consultations (with e.g. industry 
representatives, civil society, labour unions, local authorities) 
has taken place, although at different times and to different 
lengths. Regardless, the extent to which these consulta-
tions actually influenced the drafting of RRPs is limited.
In France, the very early publication of France Relance 
meant that there was no time to consult the public signifi-
cantly. It is unknown whether its public stakeholder consul-
tations brought any change to the government’s plan.
In Italy, the Conte government did not engage in structured 
public consultations, although all stakeholders have been 
engaging in the public debate around the RRP. When Draghi 
took office, he did consult with several stakeholders (i.e. 
trade unions, industry, sectoral and environmental asso-
ciations), but the results are yet to be seen. The Draghi 
government consults with regional authorities, who will be 
in charge of parts of the implementation, frequently.
In Greece, a public deliberation process took place in late 
December 2020, with several stakeholders providing their 
opinions on the RRP. Additionally, in the summer of 2020, 
the government tasked a group of experts, led by economist 
and Nobel laureate Christopher A. Pissarides, with develop-
ing a national plan for the recovery and sustainable growth 
of the Greek economy. This report was published in late 
2020, and its recommendations are included in the RRP. 
The Greek government has outlined a brief communication 
strategy on sharing information on the funding of RRF activ-
ities and their impact on the national economy. Additionally, 
it will set up a website dedicated to the RRP.
Some working groups were set up in Poland to select the 
projects to be included in the RRP, although their composi-
tion is unknown. Following the draft publication in late Feb-
ruary, a consultation process took place March. However, it 
was probably too late to influence the RRP significantly. 
Belgium’s decision-making system is unique compared 
to the other sample countries in that it does not envisage 
a hierarchy of norms between the federal level and the 
federated entities. Its multi-level governance means that 
the federated entities largely and exclusively carried out the 
discussion on the allocation of RRF funding. These entities 
are the three regions – Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels-Capital 
– and the three language communities. While other institu-
tional actors were consulted, they did not have the power to 
determine funding allocation. Due to the country’s federal 
model, consultation processes were initiated at both the 
federal and federated entity levels, which exacerbated the 
lack of national vision and regional fragmentation. 19
3.3.  POINTS OF CONTENTION
While the RRP was not the subject of significant criticism 
in some of the sample countries, the debate was heated in 
others. 
In Greece and France, the draft plans were overall well 
received. Some expert debates in Greece were concerned 
with specificities. In France, only a couple of criticisms were 
raised around the soundness and additionality of some 
measures and the presence of current expenditures.
In Belgium, the main conflict regarded the allocation of 
funds between the federal entities, leading to a politi-
cal deadlock. The lack of coherence among the projects 
included in the RRP has also been mentioned in the public 
discourse: the RRP has been labelled a collection of recy-
cled projects that will fail to lead to a successful national 
recovery.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
18    Conseil Central de l’Economie & Conseil Fédéral du Développement Durable, Avis intermédiaire sur les orientations stratégiques du projet de plan pour la reprise et la résilience, 18.02.2021 
19    See for instance : Brupartners, CONTRIBUTION Dans le cadre des priorités partagées de la Stratégie GO4 Brussels 2030 Projet de Plan pour la Reprise et la Résilience - Projets bruxellois – 16.02.2021
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Severe disagreements exist within both Italy’s and Poland’s 
government coalitions. In the latter, they mainly concern the 
RRP with respect to the funding allocated to different com-
ponents. However, it also relates to larger disagreements 
within the government over the rule of law mechanisms tied 
to the Multiannual Financial Framework and NGEU. In Italy, 
the main points of contention that led to the Conte gov-
ernment’s collapse included the incoherent and disjointed 
vision, the proposed governance structure, and the lack of 
a clear timeline and impact assessment for some projects. 
The new government is expected to address these issues in 
the next RRP draft, which is not yet available to the public.
3.4.  GOVERNANCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The five case studies have put in place different RRP gov-
ernance structures. 
The French prime minister’s office and economy ministry 
are drafting the RRP. The latter will also coordinate the 
implementation once approved. A governance structure 
composed of a national council, general secretariat and re-
gional councils will be responsible for executing, monitoring 
and evaluating the implementation.20
A special governing committee composed of several min-
istries is in charge of the Greek RRP drafting process, while 
the “Special Coordinating Service for the national recovery 
and resilience plan” will be responsible for the implementa-
tion until 2027. 
Belgium’s RRP drafting process is coordinated by the State 
Secretary for Scientific Policy, Recovery Program and Stra-
tegic Investments and five working groups, each dedicated 
to a priority area and composed of the federated entities 
and federal government. However, the most sensitive issue 
surrounding the allocation between federated entities was 
resolved directly by the leading Minister-Presidents. The 
Federal Planning Bureau will be responsible for assessing 
the macroeconomic impact of the plan.
In Poland, the Ministry of Development Funds and Regional 
Policy will be responsible for implementing, coordinating, 
managing and reporting on the RRP. Other ministries are 
also responsible for the reforms and investment in their 
respective areas.
Lastly, Italy’s new government has mandated the economy, 
infrastructure, ecology and innovation ministries to oversee 
the drafting process. A central government structure will 
be set up to coordinate and liaise the funds between the 
European Commission and the country’s implementation 
bodies, evaluate the coherence of the RRP’s measures with 
its targets and objectives, and ensure that the funding is 
spent per the RRF rules. Most of the RRP measures will 
be implemented by local and regional authorities, not the 
central government. 
3.5.  NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IS PRESENT
Overall, the process of debating and drafting the RRPs is 
well included in the five sample countries’ public and po-
litical debates. Public opinion is, to some extent, engaged 
on the matter, while governments are taking responsibility 
and credit for the plans. The RRPs are not seen as a techni-
cal exercise to be dealt with at the working level between 
national ministries and the European Commission. Rather, 
the highest members of national governments are discuss-
ing them in the political sphere. This represents a significant 
shift from the European Semester process, which was not 
discussed in national public debates and was only consid-
ered a technical exercise. 
Importantly, two further conclusions can be drawn:
1. The RRP process has varying degrees of transparency, 
with some countries more open than others, and from 
early. However, in all five cases, it appears that the in-
house workings of governments have been kept private, 
and that the extent and influence of public consultations 
are limited and yet to be proven.
2. RRPs’ position on national political agendas varies 
between the countries. The Italian RRP is described by 
some commentators as “the most important document 
in the country’s recent history”21 and even triggered a 
government crisis. In Belgium, the deadlock over funding 
allocations could only be solved at the highest political 
level. Conversely, although some attention is given to the 
RRP in Greece, it is much less salient, and the debate on 
it limited. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
20  French Government, “France Relance Dossier de Presse”, 3 September 2020.
21  Fittipaldi, Emiliano (2021), “Litigi, ritardi e misteri: così Conte è caduto sul Recovery”, Domani: 11 February 2021.
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This section reports the main aspects of the RRPs of the 
five sample countries, with a focus on the budgets allocated 
to measures related to the twin transitions, as well as the 
relevant reform components. Preliminary estimations of 
the RRPs’ effects on social and territorial cohesion are also 
made. An accurate impact assessment is not possible at this 
stage and should be carried out over the next months (ex 
ante) and years (ex post).
4.1. FRANCE
The peculiarity of France Relance (€100 billion) is that approximately €60 billion is funded by the national budget, and €40 
billion from the EU’s RRF. It is not yet known which measures are to be funded by what source. The following analysis is based 
on the total €100 billion budget, bearing in mind that the RRF share will be less than half. To fulfil the targets imposed by the 
RRF, the French RRP will presumably include most of the measures concerning the green and digital transitions. To the best of 
our knowledge, at the time of writing, the country intends to take up only the grants disbursed by the RRF and not the loans.
Figure 1 indicates France’s sustainable and digital priorities for its COVID-19 recovery and their respective share of the 
total funding of France Relance. The Other category includes all measures that are not explicitly related to the twin transi-
tions (e.g. a production tax cut, employment support, relocation of industrial activities to France).
The included measures regard, among others, the energy 
efficiency of buildings, urban and long-distance sustainable 
mobility (i.e. the railway sector), low-carbon technologies (e.g. 
green hydrogen), the digital upgrade of SMEs and public ad-
ministrations, and sustainable agriculture. While most meas-
ures relate exclusively to either the climate or digital targets, 
some contribute to both. This is the case, for example, with the 
measures supporting green technologies, training in strategic 
sectors, and the digitalisation of transport sectors. Importantly, 
France Relance does not include any reforms. Instead, they 
are expected to be included in the RRP. As such, it remains 
impossible at the moment to assess whether investments are to 
be accompanied by regulatory change, for example.
The overall level of ‘mainstreaming’ green and digital 
objectives across measures that are not explicitly intended 
for that (i.e. included in the Other category) is satisfactory. 
For example, financial support for reindustrialisation projects 
in declining industrial areas is conditional on reducing the 
carbon footprint. Similarly, to support territorial cohesion, 
combating digital exclusion and deploying optic fibre are of 
particular interest. Importantly, however, some stakeholders 
have criticised the inclusion of measures that would conflict 
with the transitions. For example, the production tax cut of 
€20 billion would be open to all firms and not conditioned to 
any sustainability efforts.23
Most green and digital measures apply country-wide, and 
there is no specific targeting of the more vulnerable social 
groups nor of less developed regions, which has the po-
tential to widen existing disparities further, although support 
for employment and training has a focus on the youth. Some 
efforts will strengthen territorial cohesion by nature. This is 
the case with support for sustainable agriculture and rein-
dustrialisation, and optical fibre deployment. However, the 
distribution through competitive calls of funding for advanced 
(low carbon) technologies might favour implicitly more devel-
oped actors and areas.
 Case studies: 
 The content of the national plans4.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
22  Fully available here.
23  Green Recovery Tracker (2021), “Green recovery tracker report: France” 
Figure 1. 
Contents of France Relance
Source: 
Author, based on the draft 
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4.2. BELGIUM
The Belgian RRP draft – which, at the time of writing, stood at 130% of the RRF grants allocated to Belgium – amounts to 
€7.78 billion. It allocates most of its budget (i.e. approximately 75%) to ecological and digital priorities (see Figure 2). The 
amounts correspond only to the RRF grants made available to Belgium. Belgium’s uptake of RRF loans cannot be excluded, 
but none of the federated entities have requested them for now.
Private and public building renovation to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions is the largest measure in the draft proposal, 
amounting to €1.5 billion and almost 20% of RRF funding. 
Other climate-related efforts include investing in hydrogen, 
decarbonising industry, protecting biodiversity, climate 
change adaptation and greening public transport. Digital 
actions relate to the digitalisation of public administration, 
healthcare, and the cultural and educational sectors; and 
digital infrastructure deployment. Some of the remaining 
measures support both transitions indirectly, for example, 
through a specific focus on digital skills in training support.
The Belgian government has also sent a separate document 
to the European Commission outlining potential structural 
reforms to be included in the RRP. Unfortunately, the exact 
content of this document is unknown.
Due to a lack of information and detail, it is not yet possible 
to accurately assess the RRP’s impacts on cohesion. The 
main aspect worth mentioning is that the development of 
optic fibre, 5G and new technologies aims, among other 
things, to enable an inclusive and just digital transition. For 
example, the deployment of this infrastructure is expect-
ed to improve territorial connectivity, but its description 
remains very generic for now. 
The federated entities will be responsible for designing and 
implementing their ‘part’ of the funding, and the federal 
government will also have its share. The division of funding 
among entities took place at the political level and result-
ed in a rather arbitrary allocation, with a strong spatial 
concentration of some measures. While this reflects the 
regional differences in economic development (partially), it 
is hardly representative. For example, Wallonia will receive 
92% of the budget for social infrastructure, while Flanders 
will receive 84% of that for pedestrian and cycling infra-
structure. This imbalance confirms the analysis of section 3: 
the division of funding was done through political bargaining 
between the representatives of the federated entities rather 
than through any ex ante impact or needs assessment.
Figure 2. 
Contents of Belgian RRP
Source: 
Author, based on summaries 
of the RRP draft accessed by 
the project’s partners
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4.3.  POLAND
The Polish RRP draft amounts to €23.85 billion and has five components (see Figure 3). It only concerns RRF grants. The 
government has not yet decided on the uptake of loans and therefore cannot be excluded.
More than €6 billion are earmarked for the energy transi-
tion and sustainable mobility, each accounting for more 
than 25% of the total budget. The measures under these 
two categories include developing zero-emissions public 
transport, strengthening railways, and improving the energy 
efficiency of residential buildings and conditions for devel-
oping RES (including hydrogen technologies). Some of these 
measures also contribute to the digital transition (e.g. smart 
and sustainable mobility, green technologies). The digital 
transition component (€3 billion) includes strengthening 
high-speed internet to be universally accessible, as well as 
developing public e-services and digitalising the education 
infrastructure. The other components only contribute to the 
twin transitions partially, for example, through innovative 
projects in green technologies, supporting sustainable solu-
tions in enterprises and developing e-health.
An important feature of the Polish RRP is that it clearly sets 
out reforms that match the investments in each inter-
vention area. For example, removing legal obstacles and 
regulatory changes to support the development of public 
e-services and electricity distribution from RES.
While it appears that the five categories are in line with the 
RRF’s green ambitions, two measures that are likely to be 
included in the RRP are severely criticised by stakehold-
ers as environmental threats. The construction of a new 
airport, “Central Communication Port”, is believed to cause 
environmental degradation and not be aligned with Green 
Deal objectives, while a waterway is planned to go through 
the Vistula Spit, a Natura 2000 area.
Although the draft RRP does not outline the estimated 
impact of its measures in detail (e.g. performance indicators 
are not mentioned), there seems to be overall horizontal 
attention to the most vulnerable social groups across the 
components. For example, there are explicit mentions of 
reducing energy poverty by increasing efficiency, reducing 
the numbers of digital illiterates, and improving access 
to transport for those currently excluded. Concerning the 
regional dimension, there is specific support for the energy 
transition in coal regions and heavily touristic regions that 
have been most affected by the COVID-19 crisis.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Figure 3. 
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Source: Author, based 
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4.4.  GREECE
The Greek RRP draft is composed of four pillars, each with specific components. The components of the ‘Green’ (€6 billion) 
and ‘Digital’ Pillars (€2.1 billion) are reported in Figure 4. The Other category includes the two remaining Pillars, namely 
‘Employment, skills and social cohesion’ and ‘Private investments and economic and institutional transformation’. While 
the budget would only consist of RRF grants, the government also intends to make full use of the loans available (up to 
€12.7 billion). The loans would be used to support reforms to improve Greece’s business environment, simplify bureaucra-
cy and promote private investment by co-financing the twin transitions, economies of scale and R&D&I. 
The Green Pillar (€6 billion) includes measures to improve 
energy efficiency (of i.e. the electricity grid under Power Up 
and of residential buildings under Renovate) and RES use 
(Power Up). Incentives for businesses are also included. 
Additionally, it foresees rolling out an electric vehicle charg-
ing network (Recharge and Refuel), protecting the environ-
ment and climate change adaptation. Measures under this 
Pillar also support digital objectives indirectly, for example, 
through the digital monitoring of energy consumption. The 
Digital Pillar (€2.1 billion) includes the installation of optic 
fibre and 5G infrastructure (Connect), the development 
of digital public services (Modernise) and support for the 
digitalisation of the private sector (also with the dual aim 
of optimising their climate footprint). Some measures in 
the remaining two Pillars also support digital objectives, 
for instance, the promotion of digital skills and the digital 
transformation of the education and judicial systems, health 
services and tax administration.
The Greek RRP draft shows a good number of reforms that 
would accompany the investments coherently. In some 
cases, particularly the green measures, the national reforms 
already underway would be continued and expanded (e.g. 
managing natural resources, developing charging networks 
for electric vehicles). In other cases, particularly the digital 
measures, new reforms are proposed, such as a national 
artificial intelligence strategy and a central cloud infrastruc-
ture for all public entities.
Additionally, the RRP dedicates a section to the Partnership 
Agreements of the 2021-27 Cohesion Policy, outlining links 
between the RRP measures and the five objectives of Cohe-
sion Policy. References to the Just Transition Fund (JTF) are 
also present with respect to the lignite phase-out.
Overall, the plan shows a good degree of alignment to  
climate-related objectives, even in indirect form (e.g. meas-
ures for strengthening the capital market include incentives 
for green investment products). However, one vital measure 
is not aligned with climate objectives: expanding the natural 
gas network, which is a fossil fuel.
Overall, the measures’ impact on cohesion is rather well 
referenced, although often in generic terms. For example, 
there is a sensitivity to the transition needs of areas af-
fected by the lignite phase-out, the connectivity of islands, 
urban energy poverty and job creation for particular groups 
(i.e. youths, the unskilled, the highly skilled). Nonetheless, 
ascertaining whether some measures will negatively affect 
cohesion is difficult given the lack of detail in the draft RRP. 
For example, if unaccompanied by other interventions, 
certain horizontal measures may be more effective in more 
developed areas, thereby indirectly widening the economic 
gap between different regions.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Figure 5. 
Contents of Italian RRP
Source: Author, based 
on RRP draft26
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4.5.  ITALY
The Italian RRP draft envisages using the country’s share of RRF grants and loans fully, totalling around €210 billion. The 
two largest components (almost €30 billion each) include measures to improve the energy efficiency and safety (especially 
seismic) of private and public buildings, including schools and social housing, as well as strengthen railways connections 
(including freight). Other measures linked to climate objectives in the other components include developing sustainable ag-
ricultural practices, strengthening recycling and the circular economy, increasing the production and distribution of renew-
able energy, supporting sustainable local transport and protecting the environment. 
Digital efforts prominently regard the digitalisation and modernisation of public administration (including the judicial sys-
tem) and support for that of businesses. A few of the Other measures are deemed complementary to the twin transitions: 
promoting STEM skills and digitalising the education system; and creating innovation ecosystems in urban areas (especially 
in the south) that can respond to the challenges posed by the twin transitions (see Figure 5).
The Italian RRP has a very strong reform component that 
accompanies almost all types of investment. The reforms 
most relevant for the twin transitions include, among oth-
ers, the adoption of the Minimum Environmental Criteria 
for cultural activities and a national strategy for the circular 
economy, regulatory changes in waste management, the 
simplification of authorisations for the renewable ener-
gy sector and strengthening the governance of the water 
supply infrastructure. Broader structural reforms relate to 
public administration and the tax and judicial systems.
An important peculiarity of the Italian RRP is that almost 
all its components already interrelate with REACT-EU 27 
funding strongly (i.e. approximately €13 billion), as well as 
additional financing from the national budget and, in some 
cases, the European Structural and Investment Funds. This 
showcases a good degree of early planning of the uses of 
different funding sources, although many measures were 
already in the pipeline before the RRP began to be drafted. 
The Italian RRP draft has a strong focus on economic, 
social and territorial cohesion. Three transversal, horizon-
tal priorities are mainstreamed across all the components: 
women and gender equality, youth, and the economic 
development of southern Italy and reduction of territorial 
imbalances. For example, the public administration reform 
also focuses on improving women’s access to managerial 
positions, the strengthening of STEM skills pays particu-
lar attention to women, the development of the railway 
network aims to reduce the infrastructure gap between the 
north and south and the socio-economic impoverishment 
of the less connected territories, and the establishment of 
seven high-technology research centres is split between the 
north and south.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
26  Available here.  
27  REACT-EU is an additional temporary envelope of Cohesion Policy, financed mainly by Next Generation EU, to support countries’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis.
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Drawing from the individual analyses presented in the previ-
ous section, this section draws conclusions on whether the 
RRPs are likely to be effective strategies for the green and 
digital transitions. In particular, each plan’s coherence is as-
sessed, as well as that of the plans with each other from an 
EU perspective. Lastly, their foresightedness and attention 
to impacts on cohesion are evaluated. 
5.1.  COHERENT OR FRAGMENTED MEASURES?
A factor that the European Commission will assess in its 
evaluation of the RRPs is whether the measures includ-
ed are harmonious. This is easier said than done: some 
incoherence is expected, mostly since the RRPs had to be 
written quickly and different entities often elaborated differ-
ent parts.
One way to assess coherence is to analyse whether the 
measures of a RRP cross-reference each other. The five 
case studies show that this is quite rare. Complementari-
ties appear only because different measures contribute to 
the same specific objective or broad European Flagship (i.e. 
common challenges e.g. the twin transitions). However, if 
and how synergies will emerge remains to be seen. Frag-
mented measures appear particularly present in the digital 
components of the French RRP and the Italian and Belgian 
ones more generally. In the latter, standalone projects are 
present because each federated entity presented a propos-
al without coordinating with the others, and budgets were 
allocated among said entities through political bargaining. 
Considering that different ministries oversee the elabo-
ration of different parts of the RRP, national governments 
should invest time and efforts in providing a unitary vision 
across their measures beforehand.
Nonetheless, attention has generally been paid to the com-
plementarity of measures. For example, the digitalisation of 
the education system, support for STEM skills, and training 
for digital and sustainable technologies and/or sectors are 
often included in the strategies for the twin transitions.
The extent to which RRP measures are in harmony with 
and make reference to existing EU programmes and other 
national measures are also explored. EU programmes 
are rarely mentioned in RRPs. This is rather surprising 
given that member states will also be managing Cohesion 
Policy funding, and often in large amounts. Only Italy, 
Greece and Poland appear to take other EU programmes 
into account generally. As mentioned, almost all the Italian 
RRP components include REACT-EU funding and some 
limited amounts of structural funds, although their differ-
ent roles are not explained. In Poland, some RRP activities 
appear to align with those funded by the structural funds 
(i.e. the Common Agricultural Policy, JTF) but, again, how 
this will take place in practice is not outlined. In Greece, 
the Cohesion Policy objectives are mentioned explicitly 
but in rather broad terms. References to EU programmes 
are only sporadic in the French draft and absent from the 
Belgian one.28
Barring Poland, all the case studies envision additional 
funding from national budgets, although to varying de-
grees. Many Italian RRP components mentioned additional 
national financing, although a precise breakdown and the 
potential complementarities are not present. The Belgian 
government had originally intended to develop a broader 
recovery strategy with additional national funding, but 
regional recovery strategies are progressively replacing 
this. These regional plans are not synergic to the overall 
RRP and consist of projects that have been in the regions’ 
drawers for years. The Greek RRP makes links to nation-
al strategies, for example, those related to energy and 
climate, a just transition, higher education, research and 
technology for smart specialisation, and transport. The 
majority of France Relance measures are to be financed by 
the national budget. The RRF will finance 40% of France 
Relance, but the selection of measures to be included is 
still unknown. 
In this respect, national governments should link their RRPs 
to their broader strategies for EU funding. This is especially 
relevant for the Cohesion Policy, which will be implement-
ed over the next decade and has strong complementary 
potential with the RRF measures. Overall, while the RRP 
measures are coherent in the objectives, cross-referencing 
and references to other EU programmes are scarce.
5.2.  RRP PRIORITIES ARE ALIGNED, 
 BUT THE CROSS-BORDER DIMENSION 
 COULD BE STRENGTHENED
The common objectives for measures financed by the RRF 
(i.e. its six pillars) and quantitative targets for spending 
related to the twin transitions guarantees – at least on 
paper – that there is a framework that ensures that all 
national RRPs have a common trajectory. All five analysed 
RRPs share similarities. For example, renovating buildings 
to improve their energy efficiency is always one of the most 
funded measures, revealing its importance for the coun-
tries. Support for and development of sustainable mobility 
is also a measure that receives significant funding in all five 
countries. 
Digital measures, including the digitalisation of public ser-
vices and support for the private sector, tend to receive less 
funding than green ones. This is (partly) because the target 
 An effective, EU-wide strategy for the twin transitions 
 and economic prosperity?5.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
28  This refers to the summary draft plan that we had access to. It cannot be excluded that references to EU programmes are included in the consolidated version of the plan sent to the European Commision.
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for digital spending is lower than that for green spending 
(i.e. 20% instead of 37%) but can also showcase different 
priorities. An exception is Belgium, where the digitalisation 
of public administration is the second-largest component 
and accounts for almost 10% of its total RRP budget.
The RRP’ coherence with EU objectives is also ensured by 
the need to align with CSRs. It emerges that overall, RRP 
measures are in line with the CSRs relevant for the twin 
transitions.
Lastly, the international dimension of RRPs should be 
studied, assessing whether cross-border projects are 
envisaged and if and how synergies across countries will 
emerge. Overall, these appear scarce. French support for 
green hydrogen will be coordinated with other member 
states via a new Important Project of Common European 
Interest (IPCEI).29 The development of green hydrogen is 
also mentioned as a cross-country project in the Belgian 
RRP, together with the deployment of 5G and broadband 
networks – although only in generic terms. The Greek RRP’s 
Digital Pillar includes investing in the development of 5G 
cross-border corridor but does not exemplify how this will 
occur. The possibility of IPCEIs is also mentioned in the 
Polish components for the digital transition, as well as plans 
to implement joint projects under the Digital Europe Pro-
gramme and Connecting Europe Facility. However, details 
are again lacking. The Trans-European Transport Network 30 
is mentioned in the Polish and Italian RRPs as priority areas 
for new and/or upgraded infrastructure, including electric 
vehicle charging infrastructure, the modernisation of inter-
modal terminals, railways and port infrastructure. 
The international dimension of RRPs is overall rather lim-
ited. The general lack of multinational projects can be ex-
plained with the generic assessment included in the Polish 
plan: such projects are overly complex and risky as many 
beneficiaries from different countries are involved. Howev-
er, these interventions can crucially strengthen the Single 
Market, improve connectivity among countries (especially 
peripheral areas), and generate efficiency gains through 
common projects. Governments should thus explore ways 
to include multinational projects in their strategies.
 
5.3. RRPS SET THE BASIS FOR A GOOD STRATEGY 
 GENERALLY BUT CAN STILL BE IMPROVED
The assessment of the five national RRP drafts shows that 
the countries are broadly on the right track when it comes 
to preparing a strategy with long-term impacts: economic 
growth, job creation and structural changes with respect 
to the twin transitions. The RRPs aim to achieve all three 
impacts by ensuring that investments and reform affect 
growth and employment positively. For example, by 2026, 
Greece’s RRP is expected to increase its GDP by 7 percent-
age points and create up to 200,000 full-time jobs (i.e. 4% 
increase in employment).31 The Italian draft estimates that 
thanks to its investments, GDP will be 3 percentage points 
higher than the baseline scenario in 2026. This figure would 
rise further with reforms.
A long-term impact of measures is one of the European Com-
mission’s requirements, so the RRF framework supports this 
thinking of structural interventions. However, the risk that the 
measures represent short-term fixes and/or are not structur-
al and foresighted enough remains. 
This risk appears concrete in the Belgian draft, as most of 
its measures are oriented towards short-term solutions by 
covering investments already planned and continuing exist-
ing policies rather than investing in a successful transition 
in the long run. While common overarching values underpin 
the RRPs, the measures are highly fragmented, mostly due to 
the federated entities proposing different projects. Addition-
ally, the size of the RRF contribution allocated to Belgium 
is relatively small, thus limiting its ability to deliver the twin 
transitions. 
France Relance is a mix of structural and short-term 
measures. Approximately half of its measures is considered 
to support resilience and structural support in the medium 
and long term. Conversely, short-term economic support 
is estimated to account for between 20% and 50% of the 
measures, depending on how they are categorised.32 Impor-
tantly, France Relance has a much larger budget and scope 
than the RRP, and thus the latter will likely only include the 
most relevant measures aligned with the RRF’s framework. 
Additionally, reform components will have to be added to 
the RRP, which are still absent. Overall, France Relance 
presents a rather comprehensive and ambitious investment 
strategy, especially regarding the sustainable transition, 
while measures linked to digitalisation appear less coher-
ently structured.
The Greek RRP aligns its actions with the well-known 
structural and long-term needs of the Greek economy. 
An expert group published a report analysing these needs 
in late 2020 (see section 3). Based on this report, the Greek 
RRP focuses on the economy’s structural problems rather 
than short-term issues. The RRP thus appears foresighted 
and could shift Greece’s trajectory towards a more resilient 
and sustainable growth model. However, although this ap-
pears to be the case for the economy and the state, it is less 
relevant for the green transition. For example, the RRP does 
not mention the climate-related challenges of coastal areas, 
which constitute large parts of the country, or issues related 
to increasingly frequent and adverse weather phenomena 
(i.e. wildfires, floods). Similarly, references to the circular 
economy are very limited. In this respect, the plan’s fore-
sightedness and comprehensiveness could be improved.
As mentioned, the Italian draft RRP is being revised by the 
new Draghi government. However, the previous govern-
ment’s draft already showed a good degree of long-term 
thinking and a significant number of measures well-suited 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
29 Important Projects of Common European Interest are multinational projects in a highly innovative, value-added industrial sector that benefit from relaxed state aid rules.
30 The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) aims to develop an EU-wide network of transport infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways, airports, ports) to improve the connectivity of different regions.
31 This is the analysis of two studies, one by the Bank of Greece and one by the Council of Economic Advisors at the Ministry of Finance, which have been presented to the Parliament but are not publicly available.
32  Chaney Eric (2020), “Plan de relance: répondre à l‘urgence économique”, Paris: Institut Montagne ; and Faure-Schuyer, Aurélie and Julia Symon (2021), “Is France ‘building back better’ or back to business as usual?”, Finance Watch.
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for the medium and long term. This includes, for example, 
long-overdue structural reforms (of e.g. the judiciary and 
public administration, infrastructural upgrades and at-
tempts to reduce disparities within the country). Neverthe-
less, this foresightedness does not appear to be accompa-
nied by a unitary vision that interlinks and creates harmony 
between the different measures, leading to excessive 
fragmentation and many small-scale projects. A more 
comprehensive vision of interrelated measures would make 
Italy’s strategy stronger.
The Polish RRP appears rather comprehensive but largely 
in line with the government’s priorities over the previous 
years, with many measures already in the pipeline, espe-
cially digitalisation and new technologies. It sets out a good 
level of ambition for the green transition, which will be quite 
far-reaching in a country with poor air quality and a heavy 
reliance on coal. Importantly, however, the RRP omits some 
necessary but politically risky reforms, such as changes in 
the labour market due to the energy transformation and 
of the retirement age. These should be included to ensure 
a comprehensive strategy that accounts for all indirect 
effects.
Importantly, while RRP measures may represent a signif-
icant part of government expenditures, countries will also 
continue to implement measures through their national 
budget. It is impossible to account for what governments 
do outside of the RRF’s framework, and if and how these 
actions are in line with the objectives of the twin transitions. 
Focusing only on the RRPs, there is a risk that governments 
are overselling their efforts for the twin transitions. For ex-
ample, although Poland has recently set 2049 as the target 
year for a complete phase-out from using coal for electricity 
production, it is also planning to continue subsidising coal 
production, regardless of the falling demand and financial 
losses.33
Lastly, the extent to which the RRPs represent new, inno-
vative thinking – or, rather, are collections of pre- 
decided measures – is explored. Overall, it appears 
that there is a mixture of both, with a strong presence 
of the latter. While there are significant amounts of ‘new’ 
interventions, governments are using the RRPs to repack-
age actions that have been in the pipeline for years. 
Examples include the French production tax cut, some 
public transport projects in Belgium and Poland’s Clean 
Air programme. Nevertheless, these existing projects are 
usually aligned with the broader objectives. RRF funding 
will be used to increase their budgets and accelerate the 
roll-out. Additionally, given the very tight time constraints 
to design RRPs, it is understandable that relevant, pre- 
existing measures have been proposed. In some cases, 
this option may even be preferable if the alternative is new 
but badly designed projects.
5.4 IMPACTS ON COHESION ARE CONSIDERED 
 AT DIFFERENT DEGREES ACROSS PLANS 
 AND COULD BENEFIT FROM MORE DETAIL 
To be successful, structural transformations aligned with 
the twin transitions must limit their impacts on cohesion. If 
not, the acceptance and effectiveness of the changes will be 
jeopardised (see section 2). With ‘social and territorial co-
hesion’ as one of its six pillars, the setup of the RRF partially 
reflects this need. Additionally, national RRPs are required 
to have a long-lasting impact. This implies, at least on pa-
per, an enhancement of cohesion or a limitation of negative 
effects at a minimum. Questions on this can be measured 
and assessed in practice remain, nonetheless.
The EPC–KAS assessment of the expected impact on cohesion 
shows that while most of the sample countries recognise 
and reflect this in their objectives reasonably well, the lack 
of detail and thorough impact assessments imply that the 
issues related to cohesion are not necessarily addressed 
comprehensively. Even in the Italian RRP, which is the one 
that mainstreams cohesion impacts horizontally across all 
measures, the impact assessment is not satisfactory in some 
cases and could be developed further. The Greek and Polish 
RRPs contain a certain degree of sensitivity to vulnerable 
groups and regions, but the expected impact on cohesion is 
outlined in generic terms and performance indicators are lack-
ing. In the French and Belgian plans, this sensitivity is much 
less present. It appears that the reduction of social and terri-
torial disparities is considered a positive secondary effect of 
some measures rather than an objective per se. For example, 
the roll-out of digital infrastructure will benefit less connected 
areas indirectly by improving their access. 
Across the RRPs, there is a shared concern that some 
untargeted, country-wide measures might experience more 
effective uptake in more advanced areas, thereby rein-
forcing disparities. Additionally, there is a tendency to only 
outline social impacts in positive terms. For instance, the 
measures’ effects on the labour market are often references 
related to job creation and never job displacement. Impor-
tantly, there is little to no reference made to complementa-
rities with Cohesion Policy funding, which could be used to 
smoothen some of the indirect effects.
In conclusion, the five draft RRPs are a good basis for rolling 
out the twin transitions coherently overall, but the devil is in 
the details. While the framework appears solid when study-
ing their objectives– measures aligned to common targets, 
the right pace set for a medium- to long-term strategy –, 
there is room to improve the outlining of the measures. This 
is the case for intra- and inter-RRP coherence, links to other 
EU programmes and their impacts on cohesion. The following 
section presents recommendations to address these issues.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
33  Euractiv (2020), “Poland agrees to shut coal mines by 2049”, 26 September 2020.  
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The following recommendations are drawn to make RRPs 
more effective in achieving the twin transitions fairly and 
spurring economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
This paper’s five sample countries can be used to make 
generalisations on the process and content of the RRPs and 
provide indications for the other 22 member states. The Eu-
ropean Commission and the member states should consider 
these recommendations in their exchanges in the months 
preceding the former’s approval.  
RECOMMENDATION 1: 
IMPROVE THE CONTENT 
The Commission’s relatively tight mandatory framework, 
set objectives and targets provides some consistency and 
coherence to the RRP structure. However, this is occasion-
ally only the case for objectives, with (significant) fragmen-
tation present among the measures and lack of a vision that 
convenes reforms and investments in a detailed, comple-
mentary manner.
> The Commission should work with national governments 
to improve their measures’ cross-references, and 
change their view of projects from standalone actions to 
interlinked components of a larger strategy. 
Additionally, while some countries do include other EU and 
national funding sources, this is not the standard rule. 
> National governments should identify more potential 
synergies between the RRF and other EU funding 
sources which provide large amounts of resources for 
aligned objectives and could complement support for 
sustainable economic growth (especially the Cohesion 
Policy).
Even though the choice of national expenditure is beyond 
the scope of the RRF and the Commission’s competences, 
coherence between the RRPs – which are heavily ‘biased’  
towards the twin transitions – and other national actions 
could be explored further.
Lastly, the inclusion of reform components varies greatly 
among member states. Countries with well-known struc-
tural issues (i.e. Greece and Italy) appear to consider these 
more strongly and are keener to include them in their RRPs. 
Other countries (i.e. Belgium and especially France) appear 
less or not at all inclined.
> The Commission should work with member states to 
strengthen the reform components, especially in RRPs 
where they are less present. The twin transitions will 
certainly require large amounts of funding, but this 
alone will not suffice. Regulatory changes and frame-
work reforms are crucial to set the right incentives and 
conditions for effective change and buy-in from the 
private sector.
RECOMMENDATION 2: 
STRENGTHEN THE EU DIMENSION
The previous section outlines how RRPs’ cross-border dimen-
sion remains underdeveloped, with synergies difficult to ascer-
tain. While there are some references to multinational projects 
and alignments to EU-wide infrastructure networks, they are 
often not detailed. This absence may be excusable due to the 
short time the plans have been drafted in and the complexity 
of planning such projects. Nonetheless, cross-border actions 
should be considered to create synergies, leading to efficiency 
gains, growth and a stronger Single Market.
> When assessing the RRPs, the Commission should not 
analyse each separately but rather maintain an overview. 
Given that the national governments are unaware of the 
contents of the other countries’ RRPs, the Commission’s 
comprehensive view should highlight potential areas for 
synergies across countries and cross-border projects. 
It should then put a flexible framework for cooperation 
among governments into place by brokering the first 
steps to reduce complexity and risks.
RECOMMENDATION 3: 
MAINSTREAM SUPPORT FOR COHESION
Efforts to maintain and improve social and territorial cohe-
sion are clearly outlined in some RRPs and missing from 
others which consider it a by-product. Even in the former’s 
case, the measures are developed in generic terms and lack 
a detailed impact assessment.
> The Commission should request governments to present 
ex ante territorial impact assessments of their meas-
ures. They would crucially assess the areas where country- 
wide measures would impact and potentially overcome 
the risk of concentration in more advanced areas, which 
are already more prone to obtaining incentives.
> The Commission should also request governments to 
present ex ante social impact assessments of their 
measures. They would address the potential social exclu-
sion of certain population groups from the measures and 
rectify this, especially those who risk being affected by 
the COVID-19 crisis and the twin transitions dispropor-
tionally.
 Making the most 
 of a unique opportunity6.
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> Investments and reforms should not be only assessed 
with respect to economic growth but also their contribu-
tions to the well-being of citizens. The measurement 
of well-being should be developed and included in the 
assessment of RRP implementation over the next few 
years. The RRF is an opportunity to pursue a model of 
growth that is both environmentally and socially sustain-
able.
RECOMMENDATION 4: 
GET THE IMPLEMENTATION RIGHT
The devil is in the details. Our assessment shows that the 
draft RRPs’ objectives are largely in line with the RRF frame-
work. Nonetheless, the detailed design of the measures 
will determine the effectiveness of the implementation and 
whether it will lead to a long-lasting impact. This not only 
applies to investment but, even more importantly, struc-
tural reforms. If implemented quickly without the proper 
planning, RRPs can lead to a waste of resources and serious 
structural damage.
> Considering the limited amount of time, the Commis-
sion should ensure that national governments provide 
as many details as possible on the planned measures 
and respective targets. The more detailed the plan, the 
lower the risk of errors in the implementation phase and 
the easier the monitoring of progress. More important-
ly, maximum effort will be needed in the intermediate 
and ex post assessments of measures, including with 
respect to milestones and targets. These will allow 
governments to monitor the progress and assess the 
achievements. Some degree of flexibility should be 
allowed to eventually revise the design and direction of 
RRP measures in light of changing circumstances if they 
are found to be suboptimal.
Lastly, the RRP drafting process is characterised by limited 
transparency and involvement of stakeholders and civil 
society. Governments tend to lead the process behind 
rather closed doors. National governments should im-
prove the transparency of the implementation phase by 
strengthening social dialogue, including stakeholders in 
the implementation process, and clearly communicating 
approaching targets and the fulfilment of objectives.
 
Studying the five draft RRPs, the member states appear on the right 
track. However, the road ahead is still long. Considering that the drafts 
analysed may not be the final version submitted to the European 
Commission, some countries still need to improve the details and 
coherence of their reforms and investments, as well as conduct a 
thorough impact assessment. Many of these issues can and will be 
(partially) solved during the continuous dialogue between governments 
and the Commission. This paper highlights some major areas where 
improvements efforts should be made.
This opportunity to mobilise large amounts of investment and support 
structural reforms towards a more sustainable and prosperous 
European economy is unprecedented. The correct implementation 
of the RRPs will be crucial not to waste this opportunity and is the 
responsibility of national governments. Over the next months and 
years, the monitoring and assessment of national performances will 
require a large degree of attention. Approving the national RRPs is only 
the first step in a years-long process that has the potential to make the 
EU more sustainable, prosperous and cohesive.
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